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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a production function to examine the channels through which remittances affect 
output per worker in 31 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries from 1980-2010.  We find that 
remittances directly increase output per worker if complemented with education. The indirect 
effects vary with the economic characteristics of the recipient nations: while remittances have 
increased human capital among the low-income nations, among the upper-middle-income 
nations, they have mostly increased total factor productivity, but are still inversely related to 
factor inputs among the lower-middle-income nations of SSA.  Finally, remittances are more 
effective when institutional risk is reducing.       
 
 
JEL classification: F22. F24, F35, F43, F63, O15, O16; O43; O55 
Key words: remittances, output per worker, total factor productivity, Sub-Saharan Africa      
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1. Introduction 
According to the African Economic Outlook (AEO, 2014), external financial flows have 
quadrupled since 2000 and are projected to reach over USD 200 billion in 2014.  Fig.1 illustrates 
that official remittances (REMI)
1
have overtaken official development assistance (ODA) and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as the largest source of international flow of financial resources 
into Africa.  The composition of these flows has also changed progressively with foreign 
investments and remittances from non-OECD countries, underpinning this positive trend.  
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Fig.1: Total external financial flows to Africa (billions USD, current)
Source: African Economic Outlook 2013 - © OECD 2013  
 
The AEO (2014) report points out that the aggregate numbers in Fig.1 hide the 
differences in the relative importance of the financial flows into countries at different levels of 
average income, namely, the low-income, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income 
countries.  Among the 27 low income countries, ODA makes more than 50 percent of the total 
external financial flows, however as a share of GDP, while still highest, it is on a decline from an 
average of 13.1 percent in 2000-2005 to 9.5 percent in 2013 and is projected to be 8.9 percent in 
2014.  On the other hand, among the lower-middle-income African countries, remittances are the 
most important, representing approximately 55 percent of the external financial flows, while 
among the upper-middle-income African countries, private investment, on average, accounts 
for70 percent of total external flows over 2010-2014.  In addition, while remittances are the 
largest single external flow to Africa, in 2013 North Africa received close to half of all 
4 
 
remittances due to its proximity to Europe.  Of the 27 low-income nations in SSA, our sample 
includes 16; of the 13 lower-middle-income, it includes 10, and of the 7 upper-middle-income, 
we include 5. When scaled by gross domestic product, REMI are relatively higher than ODA and 
FDI among the middle-income nations of SSA, most of which are included in our sample, thus 
making our sample very representative for the study of remittances.    
Given the surge in remittances during the decade when economic growth in Africa has 
also been at an all-time high, it is crucial to investigate how and whether remittances have 
contributed to the economic performance of Africa.  This paper uses a standard production 
function framework to investigate the direct and indirect effects of remittances on output per 
worker.  Specifically we ask two questions: first, do remittances directly increase output per 
worker in SSA?  Second, could the effects of remittance on output per worker be more indirect 
than direct?  The indirect effects are investigated via the impacts of remittances on the 
contributions of physical capital, human capital, and total factor productivity to output per 
worker in SSA while controlling for the official assistance flows, foreign direct investment, and 
openness.    
We find that the impacts of remittances are more indirect than direct, and often with a 
lag.  Remittances are in both cash and kind, but remitters not only send funds and equipment, 
they also send entrepreneurial ideas on how funds, tools, and businesses are to be managed. 
There are several ways in which remittances can increase capital stock: sending equipment and 
machinery, using the sent cash to purchase machinery, and increased consumption demand can 
induce capital investment.  The idea that remittances increase capital investment is supported by 
the positive effect from the lag of remittances.  The effect of remittances on human capital is also 
found to be lagged: remittances flow at the cost of emigration, which reduces the average level 
of skill in the country of emigration.  However, the lag of remittances has a positive effect on 
human capital.  This implies a combination of several impacts: remittances are either putting 
more individuals in school and/or for more years, or emigration encourages schooling, and/or 
improvement in human capital driven by other factors increases the effectiveness of remittances 
than otherwise.  Remittances ostensibly boost the contribution of total factor productivity to 
output per worker in SSA.  Total factor productivity is a multifactor variable that represents 
efficiency, knowledge of the production process, management, skill, experience, technology, 
institutions, and other influences to productivity.  Above all, remitters also create contact 
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between a higher income and lower income economies, which can help to defuse knowledge and 
efficiency.    
The contributions of remittances to productivity can be ambiguous because of their 
connection with emigration.  Lucas (1988) points out that since education is a major determinant 
of long-term growth, migration of individuals with above average skills is detrimental for the 
country of emigration. However, this view has been brought under some theoretical questioning.  
According to Beine at al. (2001) if in a poor country the return to education is low, there will be 
limited incentives for schooling.  Migration to countries with higher returns to education would 
thus restore the incentive to invest in education.  Another variation of this argument can be: 
individuals would invest more in education, and students apply themselves more to learning for 
the purpose of the migration opportunity which might not materialize.  Since only a fraction of 
the educated individuals migrate, the remaining population would, on average, be more educated 
than otherwise.  
Essentially, remittances come at the cost of brain drain, in which case, the cost might be 
balanced-off by the inflows.  Thus the long-run net effect of remittances versus emigration on 
output per worker is not obvious both in literature and practice. Ngoma and Ismail (2013), 
Osabuohien and Efobi (2013), and Nyarko and Gyimah-Brempong (2011) have postulated that in 
the long-term, education is a more optimal mechanism of social protection than such cash 
transfers.  Since average output per worker is a stronger form of social protection, and education 
is the metric of human capital, we translate the problem statement into a production function.  As 
far as we have reviewed, the strands of literature that document the effects of remittances in 
Africa have not employed variables that directly enter into the production function:  Beine et al., 
(2001); Woodruff and Zenteno (2007); Yang (2008, 2011); Fosu (2012)
2
; Nyamongo et al., 
(2012); and Ebeke (2012).  This paper fills that gap by using a production function framework to 
assess the effects of the increasing remittances on output per worker.  Instead of selecting 
channels from outside the output model, we examine the effect of remittances on the 
contributions of factor inputs towards output per worker, namely, capital per worker, human 
capital, and total factor productivity.  We prefer to do this, above all, because standard growth 
models have, at their core, a production function. 
Our analysis begins with an aggregate production function adopted from Hall and Jones 
(1999), also used by Frankel and Romer (1999), whereby output per worker is a function of the 
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capital-worker ratio, human capital and total factor productivity.  To examine the contribution of 
remittances to output per worker, we proceed in two stages: first, we estimate an aggregate 
production function where output per worker is the dependent variable with capital-per-worker 
ratio and human capital are the independent variables.  This specification enables us to capture 
the total factor productivity and to account for the output per worker.   Since we want to find out 
whether remittances have any direct contribution to output per worker, we again estimate an 
extended aggregate production function where output per worker is the dependent variable, 
controlling for remittances and other forms of foreign financing, namely, foreign direct 
investment and aid, and trade openness in addition to capital-per-worker and human capital. We 
find that remittances are negatively related to output per worker, but the interactive term between 
remittances and average years of schooling is positive and statistically significant.  Hence our 
initial estimations are sensitive to specifications and are inconclusive.  
Second, since remittances do not directly enter a production function as an input, we 
assess how remittances might contribute to the output per worker by examining the extent and 
direction in which they affect the contributions of capital per worker, human capital, and factor 
productivity to output per labor.  At this stage of analysis, we do a growth accounting analysis 
and develop three equations: where the contributions of physical capital, human capital, and total 
factor productivity are the dependent variables in three different equations in which we regress 
on the remittances while controlling for foreign direct investment, aid, trade-openness, 
institutions, income group level, and interaction terms.  The interaction terms are important 
because remittances might have an effect on output through other factors, especially education, 
trade, official development assistance, and foreign direct investment, but also depending on the 
level of average income or institutional risk.  The interactive terms might have either a positive 
effect or a substitution effect.  In the event of a substitution effect, the interactive term will have 
a statistically significant negative coefficient.   
 
2. Brief literature review  
Our paper has a dual focus on the SSA and the use of a production function framework.  
The focus on the SSA nations is based on Singh et al. (2011), whom find that while using a 
broad sample increases the degree of freedom, it may introduce unwanted heterogeneity if the 
factors that explain remittance differ across country groups.  Most the empirical literature on the 
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remittances-economic growth relationship has been based on an assortment of various samples of 
countries. There are not many papers that focus specifically on the SSA, yet economic 
interventions have had different outcomes in the SSA relative to other developing regions, 
especially, Asia and Latin America.  Our sample is exclusively selected from SSA because the 
pattern of economic realities in SSA has behaved differently for most of the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s.  According to Freeman and Lindauer (1999), modern economic growth has succeeded in 
increasing the wellbeing of hundreds of millions of people in many developing economies 
throughout the world, but it has sputtered throughout most of Africa.  Perkins et al. (2013) find 
that by 2005, the poverty gap had fallen to 10 percent or less everywhere, but in SSA, it 
remained at over 20 percent.  For instance, Perkins et al. (2013) find that poverty reduction was 
dramatic throughout all of East Asia, but the trend was worse in SSA; whereas population grew 
in SSA, absolute poverty increased from 214 million in 1981 to 391 million in 2005.  The 
effectiveness of remittances might also be different in the various major regions of the world, 
hence the need for region specific studies.    
The application of a production function framework is in turn based on Rao and Hassan 
(2012) who hold that while it is common to regress an average growth rate or income level on 
remittances and set of controls variables, but some of these variables also include the channels 
through which remittance affect growth.  Such specifications are likely to provide unreliable 
estimates because the channels may also capture the growth effects of remittances.  Hence the 
growth effects of remittances are found to be generally insignificant or even negative.  Rao and 
Hassan (2012) investigate whether the direct and indirect growth effects of remittances are 
significant using an assortment of 40 countries, including only 10 SSA nations.  To find the 
direct effects, they estimate an extended production function with income per worker as the 
dependent variable, while capital per worker is the independent variable controlling for 
remittances, investment rate, foreign direct investment, development of the financial sector, 
exchange rate, inflation, and government consumption. Using a system of GMM estimation, they 
do not find any direct effects of remittances on growth.  However, they find strong evidence of 
the effects of remittances on the channels of volatility of output, financial sector development, 
investment rate, and real exchange rate.  While our paper also estimates a production function 
using GMM dynamic panel data techniques of estimation, our consideration of channels is 
different.  Instead of selecting channels from outside the model, we examine how remittances 
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affect the inputs in a standard production function, namely, capital per worker, human capital, 
and total factor productivity as the key channels through which remittances may indirectly 
promote output per worker.     
Singh et al. (2011) use fixed effects and two-stage least squares techniques on data from 
36 SSA countries and find the effect of remittances on the growth rate of per capita real GDP to 
be negative and significant, whether or not interaction terms are included.  This result suggests 
that the adverse effects of emigration on growth may dominate, at least in the SSA.  However 
when Singh et al. (2011) interact remittances and domestic institutions, they find that SSA 
nations with improving domestic institutions unlock the potential for remittances to contribute to 
faster economic growth.  Thus remittances have either a less negative or even a positive impact 
where institutions are strengthening and the financial sector is developing.  Other papers that find 
a negative association between remittances and growth are: Chami et al. (2003), Chami et al. 
(2006), and Chami et al. (2008).  They study the role of remittances in the context of labor 
supply and find that remittances may reduce labor supply or labor market participation of 
recipients, a moral hazard problem, leading to a decline in output and greater volatility in 
economic activity.  However, using a sample of 70 countries, including both advanced and 
developing economies, Chami et al. (2009a,b) find that remittance flows provide a stabilizing 
influence on output.  Their results, however, indicate that this stability-enhancing contribution is 
achieved at the lower levels of remittances and are not significant in countries receiving large 
flows of remittances. In their growth-remittances estimated equation, Singh et al. (2011) include 
along with remittance variables whichRao and Hassan (2012) term as channels in the same 
equation, namely, investment, financial development, government expenditure, inflation, and 
exchange rate together with interactive terms.    
Nyamongo et al. (2012) investigate the role of remittances and financial development on 
economic growth in a panel of 36 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980–2009.  
Using a panel of 36 African nations, they estimate an extended growth model where the growth 
rate of real GDP per capita is regressed on its lag, remittances, and financial development while 
controlling for the ratio of gross investment to GDP, inflation, human capital, ratio of 
government consumption and trade openness.  In the pooled, and in random effects, models 
remittances to GDP have positive and significant coefficients.  However the fixed effects models 
yield insignificant results, except when remittance volatility is added.  The 2SLS models that 
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take care of endogeneity yield negative insignificant coefficients.  They also interact remittances 
with ratio of domestic credit to GDP, which is a measure of financial development, to find 
whether there is complementarity or substitutability between remittances and financial 
development.  They find that the interactive term in the fixed effects and 2SLS models is positive 
and significant.  Nyamongo et al. (2012) conclude that remittances are important in explaining 
economic growth in Africa.  The problem with such a specification is that it does not distinguish 
between direct and indirect effects; above all the variables included can affect and/or be affected 
by remittances.   The presence of a lagged dependent variable also complicates the estimation 
that the standard fixed effects (within) estimates are potentially biased. The OLS is not biased by 
the lagged dependent variable but fails to control for the country-specific unobserved effects. 
However if remittance, or any other dependent variable such as inflation and government 
consumption, is correlated with economic growth, OLS will yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates. 
Ahortor and Adenutsi (2008) study a sample of 31 small-open developing countries, 16 
of which are in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 15 are from SSA for the time period 1996-
2006. Their dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita and the independent variables 
are the log of remittances, human capital, fixed capital formation, inflation, government 
spending, and economic openness.  The impacts of all these variables are estimated in one 
equation without any distinctions between direct and indirect effects.  They also lag the log of 
remittances and find that the contemporaneous and first lag had positive impacts while the 
second lag has a negative impact on growth.   Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) study 44 SSA 
nations from 1995-2010 for the effect of remittances interacted with institutional quality on 
investment as percentage of GDP.  Using system GMM, they find that remittances increase the 
investment rate, and both financial development and intuitional quality have significant 
complementary roles on the impact of remittances. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use a sample of 100 nations, and find that remittances 
promote growth in countries with less developed financial systems by providing an alternative 
way to finance investment and helping overcome liquidity constraints. They also interact 
remittances with indicators of financial development and examine the extent of substitutability or 
complementarity.  Would this imply that remittances will most likely boost growth in SSA, or 
are there some extra conditions necessary for remittances to boost growth even in nations with 
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less developed financial systems?  It is possible that there are other factors that may explain the 
effect of remittances on growth other than the degree of financial development? For this reason 
we follow the World Bank classification of nations into low income, lower middle income, upper 
middle income and high income, and test the direct and indirect effects of remittances.  Apart 
from including 21 African nations in their sample, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) do not 
control for SSA to give us an Africa-specific effect.   
There is a lot more literature on the economic effects of remittances on developing 
nations, which focuses on the relationship between remittances and financial development, effect 
of remittances on poverty reduction, or the institutional environment through remittances can be 
effective.  This paper focuses on using a production framework to examine the effects of 
remittances on output per worker in SSA.  
 
3. Model, Data and Estimation Methodology   
3.1: Aggregate Production Function 
To apply a production function framework, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and Frankel and 
Romer (1999) to introduce the behavior of firms: an economy is considered where technology 
and schooling are labor augmenting.  This specification is particularly relevant to SSA where 
labor isthe most abundant resource.  We use an aggregate production function, where Yiis the real 
GDP in country i, specified as follows:  
         (1) 
where K, A, E and L are physical capital, labor augmenting measure of total factor productivity, 
average years of schooling, and labor respectively.  Since we do not have the data of the hours of 
work for the nations in the sample, labor is measured in terms of the percentage of the population 
between 15 and 64 years; whereϕis the growth rate of human capital.  Thus ϕ(Ei) measures the 
effect of the average years of schooling to the productivity of  labor, and the production function 
exhibits human capital-augmented labor.  Equation (1) can be re-written in output per worker 
terms dividing both sides by Li:  
         (2) 
Taking the natural logs and of equation (2) creates a linear production function:  
   (3) 
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Equation (3) says that output per worker is determined by the capital per worker, educational 
attainment and total factor productivity.  Since total factor productivity ln(Ait) is not directly 
observed, equation (3) is estimated and ln(Ait) is computed as the natural logarithm of output per 
worker not accounted for by capital per worker and human capital.   
   (4) 
Using this as our starting point we examine the channels through which remittances might affect 
output per worker.   
 
3.2:Data  
The dataset is made up of 31 selected sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the time 
period 1980-2010, and are all taken from the World Bank Database.  Countries are included on 
the basis of data availability for two key variables: remittances and average years of schooling.  
According to the World Bank, “personal remittances comprise personal transfers and 
compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind 
made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers 
thus include all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of 
employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are 
employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident 
entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of 
Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees.”  Personal transfers 
consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or 
from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between 
resident and nonresident individuals. 
The variables for the estimation of the production function are: real GDP per worker 
derived from GDP per capita and physical capital per worker, which is in turn generated from the 
gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP using the perpetual inventory method; the labor 
force is the percentage of the total population between 15 and 64 years.  The proxy stock of 
human capital is the Barro-Lee average years of schooling per person 15 years and older.  In 
accordance with the Barro-Lee five-year averaging of the years of schooling, all data are 
averaged over a 5-year periods: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010.  Averaging has 
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an extra advantage in that it mitigates the macroeconomic business cycles in investment and total 
factor productivity.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1980-2010)
±
 
Entire sample from SSA: 31 nations 
Variables: all are five year averages mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
GDP per worker 2366.69 2996.82 235.95 14988.6 170 
Capital per worker  5587.2 8346.02 140.75 45154.9 170 
Years of schooling (15 years or older)  4.28 2.09 0.62 9.56 171 
FDI/GDP 6.94 10.40 -3.56 62.23 170 
AID/GDP 15.95 17.04 -0.19 94.82 168 
Remittances percentage of GDP 4.34 12.80 0.002 95.31 171 
Openness  72.53 37.46 13.37 191.11 171 
Low Income: 16 SSA nations 
GDP per worker 811.93 981.62 235.95 9460.88 86 
Capital per worker 1379.90 2288.88 140.75 21131.25 85 
Years of schooling (15 years or older) 3.19 1.81 0.62 9.56 86 
FDI/GDP 2.42 4.69 -3.56 24.91 86 
AID/GDP 27.93 15.95 3.24 94.82 86 
Remittances percentage of GDP 1.96 2.45 0.002 10.73 86 
Openness  57.65 21.83 25.33 139.87 86 
Lower Middle Income: 10 SSA nations 
GDP per worker 1914.53 1063.22 660.91 4763.49 56 
Capital per worker 4859.87 3946.26 276.28 18443.89 57 
Years of schooling (15 years or older) 4.72 1.56 1.28 7.69 57 
FDI/GDP 16.21 12.61 2.56 62.23 57 
AID/GDP 3.15 4.51 -0.19 24.66 57 
Remittances percentage of GDP 9.57 21.11 0.02 95.32 57 
Openness  86.65 49.65 13.37 191.11 57 
Upper Middle Income: SSA 5 nations 
GDP per worker 8046.40 3049.61 3187.72 14988.6 28 
Capital per worker 19840.18 10949.1 7993.28 45154.9 28 
Years of schooling (15 years or older) 6.72 1.42 3.12 9.14 28 
FDI/GDP 1.78 2.28 -3.07 7.226 27 
AID/GDP 3.95 4.37 0.41 16.41 25 
Remittances percentage of GDP 1.0 1.46 0.004 4.82 28 
Openness  89.48 28.26 37.77 128.51 28 
± The summary statistics include only those years where data for the remittances as a percentage of GDP are 
available. The nations included are: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Zaire), The Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics summarizing data for the entire sample, the low-
income, the lower-middle-income, and the upper-middle-income, all from the SSA.  For the 
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entire sample we find that average remittances as a percentage of GDP are 4.23 percent, the 
average official development assistance as a percentage of GDP are 15.95 percent, and the 
average foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP are 6.94 percent.  Of the three forms of 
foreign financing, official development assistance is the most volatile with a standard deviation 
of 17, while fluctuations in foreign direct investment and remittances are very close at 10.4 and 
12.8 respectively.  In our sample from SSA the share in GDP of official development assistance 
is higher among the low income nations with 27.9 share of GDP while the share of FDI is higher 
among the lower-middle –income nations at 16.2 percent.   
 
3.3: Estimation Methodology   
The focus of this paper is to find the extent and channels through which remittances 
affect output per worker in SSA, controlling for other forms of foreign financing and openness.  
We focus on three primary forms of foreign financing: remittances, foreign direct investment, 
and official development assistance.  We use the fixed-effects and the two-step system GMM 
estimation procedures.   The production function of equation (5) is typically estimated using the 
fixed effects to capture the input elasticity using the within transformation, but most importantly 
it enables us to compute the total factor productivity.  This transformation eliminates both the 
individual country time-invariant effects and the constant.    
       (5) 
where , the same transformation applies to the capital-output ratio, the average 
years of schooling, and the residual.  Endogeneity is always of great concern when working with 
macroeconomic variables, especially at the second stage when we test for the indirect channels. 
We therefore use the two-step GMM, which provides a robust estimator because it does not 
require information about the exact distribution of the disturbances.  It is based on the 
assumptions that the error term is not serially correlated.  Thus disturbances in the equations are 
uncorrelated with the instrumental variables, which are lagged levels of the series after the 
equation has been first-differenced to eliminate country-specific effects.  The GMM transformed 
equation is specified as follows: 
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(6) 
where Z is a vector for the contributions of capital per worker, human capital, and total factor 
productivity while   is a vector of the estimated coefficients of capital intensity, human capital, 
and total factor productivity respectively.   
 The two-step system GMM is particularly advantageous to use because it minimizes 
biases and imprecision if the lagged levels of the series are weakly correlated with the 
subsequent differences and thus are weak instruments.  According to Blundell and Bond (1998), 
the system GMM estimator uses the levels equation 3 to obtain a system of two equations: one 
differenced (as described above) and one in levels, which increases efficiency.  By adding the 
second equation additional instruments can be obtained.  Thus the variables in levels in the 
second equation are instrumented with their own first differences.  
 Two tests are performed to assess the validity of the models: the Hansen over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR) test and the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation (AR (2)) test for the validity of 
the instruments and the absence of autocorrelation among the residuals, respectively. In order to 
further prevent the issue of instrument proliferation, we have ensured that for every specification, 
the instruments do not exceed the number of countries.  
 
4. Estimation Results  
4.1. Direct effects of remittances on income per worker 
We focus first on the direct effects of remittances on output per worker by estimating equation 
(4) using fixed effects specification, which controls for the unobserved heterogeneity.  The 
results are reported in Table 2.  Column (1) is the baseline specification of the equation, whereby 
output per worker is the dependent variable regressed on the capital per worker and human 
capital. From this column of results, we computed the contribution of total factor productivity to 
output per worker as in Equation (4).  Columns (2) through (7) consider the possibilities where 
remittances could have a direct effect on output per worker.   While controlling for inputs into 
production and other forms of foreign financing plus openness, we re-estimate Equation (4) with 
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remittances as one of the independent variables.  In almost all specifications, remittances as a 
percentage of GDP have a statistically significant negative coefficient.   This negative coefficient 
might be due to the inclusion of both direct and indirect channels, or imply that the negative 
effect of emigration outweighs the potentially positive effect from remittance inflows.  
According to Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009), there is possibility that in SSA the depth and 
severity of poverty might be motivating greater out-migration, so that poverty is positively 
associated with remittances.  In our case, remittances related to out-migration are negatively 
associated with output per worker.  The negative coefficient is also consistent with intuition and 
the predictions of economic theory. Accordingly, it is logical to expect that remittances could 
reduce the need to work or seek employment since a great chunk of remittance end-up being 
used for consumption purposes. 
However in column (5), when remittances are interacted with human capital, the 
composite variable has a statistically significant positive coefficient.  In other words, where 
human capital is increasing, an increase in remittances would increase output per worker. There 
is complementary effect. This implies that the educated are more predisposed to using 
remittances for the improvement of their income situations in a sustainable manner. It also 
follows that education mitigates the baseline negative impact of remittances on income per 
worker.  The increase in human capital could have been brought about by the remittances, other 
interventions, or both.   
 The control variables have the expected signs. First, the significant effects of schooling 
and capital stock per worker on the dependent variables are in accordance with intuition. Second, 
‘the insignificant individual direct’ effects of development assistance and trade also have logical 
explanations. With the exception of small cases like Rwanda, where foreign aid has substantially 
been used for reconstruction purposes, the economics of development assistance in Africa 
remain questionable for a plethora of reasons that are not within the scope of this paper (Asongu, 
2014).  Third, ‘the insignificant direct interactive effect’ of remittances with capital, foreign aid, 
and openness means that policy needs to put more effort in order to reap the benefits of the 
complementary effect. 
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Table 2: Fixed Effects (within) regressions of equation (5)  
 Entire Sample 31 SSA nations 
 ln (average 
GDP per 
worker) 
ln (average 
GDP per 
worker) 
ln(average 
GDP per 
worker) 
ln(average 
GDP per 
worker) 
ln (average 
GDP per 
worker) 
ln (average 
GDP per 
worker) 
ln (average 
GDP per 
worker) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average capital stock per worker 0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.220*** 
(0.000) 
0.198*** 
(0.000) 
0.211*** 
(0.000) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.185** 
(0.000) 
0.200** 
(0.000) 
 Schooling 0.129*** 
(0.001) 
0.129*** 
(0.000) 
0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.138*** 
(0.000) 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
Official Development Assistance: 
ODA 
 0.003 
(0.835) 
-0.002 
(0.907) 
-0.003 
(0.878) 
-0.004 
(0.789) 
-0.001 
(0.964) 
-0.001 
(0.934) 
Remittances: REMI  -0.063*** 
(0.000) 
-0.064*** 
(0.000) 
-0.107** 
(0.030) 
-0.103*** 
(0.000) 
-0.081*** 
(0.000) 
-0.089 
(0.258) 
 Openness   0.069 
(0.259) 
0.067 
(0.275) 
0.044 
(0.475) 
0.103 
(0.124) 
0.077 
(0.244) 
Remittances *  Average capital 
stock per worker 
   0.006 
(0.371) 
   
 Remittances * Schooling     0.010** 
(0.032) 
  
 Remittances * ODA      0.008 
(0.190) 
 
 Remittances * Openness       0.006 
(0.746) 
Constant 4.71*** 
(0.000) 
4.85*** 
(0.000) 
4.71*** 
(0.000) 
4.62*** 
(0.000) 
4.78*** 
(0.000) 
4.64*** 
(0.000) 
4.65*** 
(0.000) 
R-squared   0.335 0.467 0.473 0.476 0.493 0.481 0.473 
Observations  169 164 164 164 164 164 164 
  Time-effects (years) are included in all the fixed effects (within) regressions 
Notes for Table 2: ***significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent; p-values are in the parenthesis.  
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4.2: The indirect channels through which remittances affect income per worker 
From the results of Table 2, remittances have a negative incidence on output per worker, perhaps 
because the equations include both the direct production inputs and indirect channels.  This 
section investigates the effect of remittances on income per worker using indirect channels of 
factors of production, notably:  the contributions of physical capital, human capital and total 
factor productivity.  The basic specification for the indirect channels effect is equation (6).  
Following Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009), we include both the current and lagged remittances.The 
results for equation (6) are reported in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 4.   
 Table 3(a) reports the effect of remittances on the contribution of capital per worker to 
output per worker.  Most of the control variables are significant with the correct signs.We find 
that while the current remittances are either negatively or insignificantly related to capital per 
worker, the lagged remittances have a positive effect on capital per worker.  The interpretation of 
the latter is broadly consistent with the explanation provided in the preceding section.  The 
lagged remittances can increase investment and the contribution of capital per worker to output 
per worker over time, because while remittances are often meant for consumption, over time, 
they can indirectly and slowly boost investment due to higher demand.  The negative effect of 
foreign aid can be explained in two ways: first, foreign aid breeds corruption (Asongu, 2012) and 
deteriorates institutional quality (Asongu, 2013a), which potentially discourages capital intensity 
investment, especially if channeled through government expenditure (Asongu and Jellal, 2013) 
or public investment (Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2008). In the same vein, Simeon 
Djankov, José García-Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2006) and Stephen Knack (2001) 
find empirically that aid worsens democracy, bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, and 
corruption.  Second, countries with deteriorating economic conditions tend to receive more aid.  
Hence there is an inverse relationship between ODA and capital per worker.  We also find that 
trade openness increases physical capital and its contribution to output per worker.  Generally 
openness enables firms to take advantage of the increasing returns to scale both for current 
production and for technological development, which can involve increasing physical capital 
investment.  
Table 3(b)reports the effect of remittances on the contribution of human capital to output 
per worker.  The estimation results are all valid because the null hypotheses of the Hansen Over-
identification Restrictions and AR(2) tests are overwhelmingly rejected.The current remittances 
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have a negative effect while the lagged have a positive effect on the contribution of human 
capital to output per worker.  This finding is consistent with Table 3(a) results that while current 
remittances are negatively associated with human capital due to the emigration effect, lagged 
remittances would increase human capital due to motivational effects for higher returns abroad, 
or put more students into school for longer than otherwise or both.  The individual effect of ODA 
to human capital is negative; however the interaction term between ODA and remittances has a 
positive effect.  Aid that is channeled towards education, health, and nutrition would increase 
human capital.  We also find that openness has a positive effect to the contribution of human 
capital to output per worker both individually and in complementarity to remittances.  At the 
same time, the positive effect of openness is consistent with the implications of globalization on 
human development in Africa (Asongu, 2013b).  
On an income level analysis, human capital is significantly increasing among the low-
income nations of SSA; and if remittances are sent, recipients in low-income nations are more 
likely to invest them in education.  It is worth noting that while the lower-middle-income nations 
lead the other groups in term of remittances received as a percent of GDP, the remittances are 
negatively associated with the contribution of human capital to output per worker.  This could be 
evidence to Lucas (1988) that migration of individuals with above average skills is detrimental 
for the country of emigration.  Remittances flow at a cost of emigration: the cost might outweigh 
benefits from the external financial flows.     
Table 3(c) reports the effect of remittances on the contribution of total factor productivity 
to output per worker.  Again the specifications are all valid because the null hypotheses of the 
Hansen OIR and AR(2) tests are overwhelmingly rejected.  Among the literature that has 
examined the role of total factor productivity in the growth process of African economies, 
Devarajan et al. (2003) finds that it is the low productivity rather than the level of investment that 
has been the main constraint to African growth.  On the other hand, Fosu (2012) finds that while 
total factor productivity was the main source of the negative growth in the 1980s and early 1990s 
in SSA, the recent growth resurgence as of the mid-1990s can reasonably be attributed to major 
improvements in total factor productivity.  The growing FDI in SSA has been accompanied by 
foreign investors (like China) bringing-in their own workers (Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013), who 
can have an effect on domestic labor productivity.  
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Our findings from the total factor productivity regressions are in line with Fosu (2012): 
first, we find that remittances either in current year or after a lag will increase the total factor 
productivity.  Since some of the remittances are in cash or kind: tools and equipment, and 
remitters accompany them with entrepreneurial ideas, it is not surprising that remittances would 
increase total factor productivity.  Second, we find that individual direct effects of FDI and 
foreign aid are positive on the dependent variable, whereas there is a substitution effect between 
remittances with other foreign financial flows, FDI and foreign aid.  Third, on the income level 
analysis we find total factor productivity to be significantly increasing among the upper-middle-
income nations of SSA, and that remittances to these nations are enhancing this rise. 
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Table 3(a): Capital per worker two-step system GMM regressions of equation (6) 
 Entire Sample (31 countries) 
 
Baseline 
Equation 
Low, Low-Middle, Upper Middle Income and Openness Interaction terms: REMI, ODA and 
Openness 
Contribution of Capital  per 
Worker (-1) 
0.846*** 
(0.000) 
0.864*** 
(0.000) 
0.838*** 
(0.000) 
0.827*** 
(0.000) 
0.819*** 
(0.000) 
0.888*** 
(0.000) 
0.878*** 
(0.000) 
0.860*** 
(0.000) 
0.869*** 
(0.000) 
0.852*** 
(0.000) 
0.844*** 
(0.000) 
Remittances -0.001 
(0.974) 
-0.001 
(0.770) 
-0.002 
(0.391) 
0.001 
(0.904) 
0.001 
(0.770) 
-0.011 
(0.106) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.174) 
-0.006 
(0.383) 
-0.016*** 
(0.001) 
0.015 
(0.377) 
Remittances (-1) 
 
     0.009* 
(0.085) 
0.006** 
(0.023) 
0.011** 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.155) 
0.006* 
(0.088) 
0.005 
(0.325) 
ODA -0.006 
(0.288) 
-0.004 
(0.291) 
-0.008 
(0.244) 
-0.007 
(0.222) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010* 
(0.066) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.175) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008* 
(0.070) 
Openness  0.027** 
(0.025) 
   0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.010) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
Low-Income   -0.029 
(0.231) 
  -0.006 
(0.766) 
     
Low-Middle Income    0.001 
(0.993) 
  -0.020* 
(0.096) 
    
Upper-Middle Income     0.014 
(0.119) 
  0.045*** 
(0.003) 
   
Remittances * Low Income      -0.001 
(0.946) 
     
Remittances * Low-Middle 
Income 
      -0.010 
(0.143) 
    
Remittances * Upper-
Middle Income 
       -0.010* 
(0.070) 
   
Remittances* ODA          0.004*** 
(0.000) 
 
Remittances *Openness           -0.005 
(0.264) 
Constant 0.313*** 
(0.001) 
0.160*** 
(0.006) 
0.346*** 
(0.001) 
0.350*** 
(0.000) 
0.368*** 
(0.000) 
0.125** 
(0.015) 
0.158*** 
(0.000) 
0.211*** 
(0.000) 
0.187** 
(0.000) 
0.199*** 
(0.000) 
0.200*** 
(0.000) 
Obs. 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Instruments 16 20 18 18 18 28 28 28 22 26 26 
AR(1) [p-value] [0.173] [0.242] [0.199] [0.165] [0.168] [0.986] [0.816] [0.718] [0.520] [0.297] [0.312] 
AR(2) [p-value] [0.213] [0.225] [0.181] [0.213] [0.165] [0.293] [0.206] [0.250] [0.342] [0.309] [0.327] 
Hansen Test [p-value] [0.629] [0.505] [0.278] [0.653] [0.381] [0.329] [0.594] [0.855] [0.610] [0.488] [0.813] 
Notes for Table 3(a): ***significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent; p-values are in the parenthesis.  FDI is not included in 
this regression to avoid double counting under the assumption that it forms part of a nation’s stock of capital.   
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Table 3(b): Human Capital two-step system GMM regressions of equation (6)  
 Entire Sample 31 nations 
 B.E Low; Low-Middle and Upper Middle Income  Interaction terms 
Human Capital   
(-1) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
0.948*** 
(0.000) 
0.965*** 
(0.000) 
0.952*** 
(0.000) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
0.936*** 
(0.000) 
0.963*** 
(0.000) 
0.970*** 
(0.000) 
0.956*** 
(0.000) 
0.988*** 
(0.000) 
0.938*** 
(0.000) 
0.965*** 
(0.000) 
Remittances -0.006* 
(0.066) 
-0.005*** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.311) 
-0.007* 
(0.075) 
-0.003 
(0.125) 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017** 
(0.013) 
-0.009*** 
(0.006) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014** 
(0.003) 
-0.029*** 
(0.000) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
Remittances(-1) 
 
     0.016*** 
(0.000) 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.006* 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.816) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.007** 
(0.027) 
FDI 0.001 
(0.831) 
-0.001 
(0.826) 
0.004 
(0.340) 
0.007 
(0.102) 
0.002 
(0.666) 
-0.002 
(0.920) 
0.004** 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.143) 
-0.004* 
(0.073) 
-0.001 
(0.380) 
-0.002 
(0.171) 
0.002 
(0.383) 
ODA -0.006** 
(0.028) 
-0.003* 
(0.090) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.009) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.016*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.825) 
-0.001 
(0.896) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.471) 
Openness  0.031*** 
(0.000) 
      0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.026** 
(0.025) 
0.016** 
(0.025) 
0.014** 
(0.012) 
Low-Income   0.023** 
(0.031) 
  0.008 
(0.207) 
      
Low-Middle 
Income 
   -0.023** 
(0.014) 
  -0.032**** 
(0.000) 
     
Upper-Middle 
Income 
    -0.005 
(0.202) 
  0.007 
(0.338) 
    
Remittances *Low-
Income 
     0.016*** 
(0.006) 
      
Remittances* 
Low-Mid-Income 
      0.003 
(0.975) 
     
Remittances* 
Upper-Mid-Income 
       -0.028*** 
(0.008) 
    
Remittances* 
FDI 
         -0.002 
(0.653) 
  
Remittances* 
ODA 
          0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 
Remittances* 
Openness 
           0.006** 
(0.050) 
Constant 0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-0.039* 
(0.056) 
0.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.109*** 
(0.000) 
0.082*** 
(0.000) 
0.111*** 
(0.000) 
0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.384) 
-0.043 
(0.459) 
0.037 
(0.354) 
0.012 
(0.592) 
Obs. 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Instruments 20 24 22 22 22 28 28 28 26 30 30 30 
AR(1) [p-value] [0.241] [0.240] [0.257] [0.212] [0.253] [0.172] [0.123] [0.118] [0.220] [0.213] [0.125] [0.189] 
AR(2) [p-value] [0.231] [0.259] [0.224] [0.274] [0.213] [0.324] [0.512] [0.264] [0.285] [0.397] [0.612] [0.300] 
Hansen Test  
[p-value] 
[0.228] [0.449] [0.171] [0.348] [0.253] [0.514] [0.536] [0.743] [0.547] [0.854] [0.880] [0.762] 
Notes for Table 3(b): ***significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent; p-values are in the parenthesis. B.E ≡ Baseline Equation 
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Table 3(c): Total Factor Productivity two-step system GMM regressions of equation (6) 
 Entire Sample 31 nations 
 B.E Low, Low-Middle, Upper Middle Income, Openness Interaction terms 
Contribution of  
TFP(-1)§ 
1.09*** 
(0.000) 
0.947*** 
(0.000) 
1.03*** 
(0.000) 
1.11*** 
(0.000) 
1.06*** 
(0.000) 
1.03*** 
(0.000) 
0.926*** 
(0.000) 
0.859*** 
(0.000) 
1.01*** 
(0.000) 
0.979*** 
(0.000) 
0.968*** 
(0.000) 
0.881*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
Remittance 0.044*** 
(0.001) 
0.016 
(0.104) 
0.042*** 
(0.001) 
0.052*** 
(0.001) 
0.043*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.887) 
0.010 
(0.461) 
0.020 
(0.236) 
-0.019 
(0.271) 
-0.005 
(0.597) 
0.012 
(0.542) 
0.050** 
(0.016) 
-0.071 
(0.425) 
Remittance (-1)      0.044* 
(0.060) 
0.004 
(0.808) 
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.037* 
(0.086) 
0.029* 
(0.097) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.399) 
0.016 
(0.275) 
FDI 0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.072*** 
(0.000) 
0.059*** 
(0.001) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.041*** 
(0.001) 
0.071*** 
(0.000) 
0.075*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.061*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
ODA 0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.054** 
(0.002) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.062*** 
(0.000) 
0.043*** 
(0.001) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.030** 
(0.041) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.022* 
(0.051) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.029** 
(0.044) 
Openness  0.006 
(0.822) 
    0.001 
(0.925) 
   -0.034 
(0.534) 
-0.013 
(0.542) 
0.009 
(0.563) 
Low-Income   -0.020 
(0.557) 
    -0.072** 
(0.022) 
     
Low-Middle 
Income 
   -0.068* 
(0.068) 
    -0.075** 
(0.025) 
    
Upper-Middle 
Income 
    0.166*** 
(0.001) 
    0.240*** 
(0.000) 
   
Remittances 
*Low-Income 
       -0.072** 
(0.012) 
     
Remittances*Low
-Mid-Income 
        0.028 
(0.425) 
    
Remittances*Upp
er-Mid-Income 
         0.080* 
(0.086) 
   
Remittances* 
FDI 
          -0.020** 
(0.015) 
  
Remittances* 
ODA 
           -0.025*** 
(0.000) 
 
Remittances* 
Openness 
            0.012 
(0.537) 
Constant -0.272*** 
(0.000) 
-0.241* 
(0.086) 
-0.227*** 
(0.000) 
-0.221*** 
(0.000) 
-0.260*** 
(0.000) 
-0.215*** 
(0.000) 
-0.189*** 
(0.001) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.137*** 
(0.002) 
-0.240*** 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.950) 
-0.097 
(0.105) 
-0.108 
(0.400) 
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 125 124 124 
Instruments 20 24 22 22 22 22 26 28 28 28 30 30 30 
AR(1) [p-value] [0.050] [0.042] [0.078] [0.056] [0.076] [0.049] [0.047] [0.281] [0.037] [0.074] [0.133] [0.228] [0.053] 
AR(2) [p-value] [0.104] [0.244] [0.126] [0.116] [0.150] [0.213] [0.339] [0.406] [0.547] [0.212] [0.580] [0.784] [0.844] 
Hansen Test [p-
value] 
[0.333] [0.173] [0.372] [0.337] [0.530] [0.173] [0.215] [0.479] [0.450] [0.520] [0.490] [0.750] [0.659] 
Notes for Table 3(c): ***significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent; p-values are in the parenthesis.  §:TFP ≡ Total Factor 
Productivity; B.E ≡ Baseline Equation 
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Table 4: Remittances and Institutions (Democracy): two-step system GMM regressions of equation (6)  
 Entire Sample 31 nations 
 
  
 
 
Dependent  
Variable  
 (-1) 
0.827*** 
(0.000) 
0.817*** 
(0.000) 
0.865*** 
(0.000) 
0.850*** 
(0.000) 
0.989*** 
(0.000) 
1.00*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
0.980*** 
(0.000) 
1.06*** 
(0.000) 
1.09*** 
(0.000) 
1.02*** 
(0.000) 
1.02*** 
(0.000) 
Remittances -0.002 
(0.512) 
-0.001 
(0.844) 
0.001 
(0.827) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.495) 
-0.001 
(0.492) 
-0.002* 
(0.075) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.027) 
0.016** 
(0.027) 
-0.017 
(0.339) 
Remittances(-1) 
 
   0.019*** 
(0.003) 
   0.011*** 
(0.000) 
   0.037*** 
(0.0.009) 
FDI     -0.004* 
(0.056) 
-0.002 
(0.378) 
 -0.002 
(0.254) 
0.062*** 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
ODA -0.012*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.932) 
0.002 
(0.285) 
-0.001 
(0.419) 
-0.002 
(0.435) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.285) 
0.018* 
(0.069) 
Openness   0.018** 
(0.026) 
-0.005 
(0.462) 
  0.014*** 
(0.007) 
   0.011 
(0.717) 
 
Polity2 0.001 
(0.104) 
0.001 
(0.538) 
0.001* 
(0.056) 
0.002*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.732) 
0.001 
(0.103) 
0.005** 
(0.036) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.007** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Remittances* 
Polity2 
 -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.965) 
-0.001 
(0.258) 
 0.001 
(0.410) 
0.001** 
(0.050) 
0.001 
(0.123) 
 -0.001 
(0.371) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.902) 
Constant 0.355*** 
(0.000) 
0.199*** 
(0.000) 
0.221*** 
(0.000) 
0.356*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.053*** 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.618) 
0.072*** 
(0.010) 
-0.170*** 
(0.000) 
-0.160*** 
(0.000) 
-0.101 
(0.495) 
-0.088*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 133 133 133 133 125 125 134 134 124 124 132 124 
Instruments 20 24 28 30 24 28 28 30 24 28 28 30 
AR(1) [p-
value] 
[0.220] [0.097] [0.225] [0.790] [0.289] [0.315] [0.378] [0.231] [0.071] [0.153] [0.265] [0.095] 
AR(2) [p-
value] 
[0.204] [0.218] [0.178] [0.337] [0.187] [0.207] [0.137] [0.375] [0.207] [0.195] [0.223] [0.332] 
Hansen Test  
[p-value] 
[0.546] [0.788] [0.627] [0.915] [0.468] [0.704] [0.455] [0.760] [0.336] [0.540] [0.481] [0.621] 
    Notes for Table 4: ***significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent; p-values are in the parenthesis 
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Improvement in institutional quality has often had a positive impact on economic 
outcomes.  Roland (2014) affirms that institutions help to reduce translation costs.  Due to lack 
of longtime series data on institutional variables, such as those used by Osabuohien and Efobi 
(2013) from the World Governance Indicators
3
, we use polity2 to investigate whether institutions 
have enhanced the degree of responsiveness of the contributions of physical capital, human 
capital, and total factor productivity to output per worker.  According to Cooray and Mallick 
(2010), “Remittance flows depend on a country’s investment opportunities and social welfare 
systems, which in turn depend on its institutional development.  Moreover, migrants from a 
country with oppressive institutions prefer to settle permanently in the host country and as a 
result remit less to the home country.  We use the ‘polity2’ score as a proxy for institutions. This 
variable captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). It examines concomitant qualities of democratic 
and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive 
forms of governance.”   
Table 4 reports the interactions between institutions and remittances.  The effects from 
the current and lagged remittances on the factor inputs remain consistent with what we find in 
Tables 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c).  We find that an improvement in institutions increases the 
contributions of physical capital, human capital, and total factor productivity to output per 
worker in general, and in particular, an interaction between polity2 and remittances makes 
remittances more effective in increasing human capital productivity.  Above all, polity2 in our 
SSA sample and time period averages negative at -0.81, implying that there is still substantial 
political risk in SSA, which can limit the responsiveness of economic outcomes to interventions.  
Fosu (2008) suggests that at lower levels of democracy, the growth impact of electoral 
competitiveness tends to be adverse, that is, have a negative intermediate-democracy effect.  
With greater democratic advancement, however, these reforms can raise growth, that is, have a 
positive advanced-democracy effect.  Our study finds that the effect of polity2 though largely 
positive, its effects are inconclusive since it still has some statistically significant negative effects 
on human capital.  
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5. Discussion  
The focus on the SSA and the application of a production function framework to investigate the 
direct and indirect effects of remittances on output per worker has provided us with unique 
insights into the economic significance of foreign financing to SSA.  As observed from Fig.1, 
while all three are on an all-time high and increasing, the volume of remittances has outpaced 
FDI and ODA.  At the same time, we know that the utilizations of REMI, FDI and ODA are 
different.  While FDI is for investment, REMI and ODA are between consumption, crisis 
management, and investment.  The utilization differences will affect the direction and strength of 
impact on the economy of each type of external finances.  For this reason, we wanted to know 
their economic importance by estimating their direct and indirect contributions to output per 
worker.  
Taking a synopsis of the three main forms of foreign financing, their economic 
importance varies from country to country.  Specifically, their patterns of flow are uneven across 
the sample, and so is their relative importance in terms of their shares of the GDP of recipient 
countries.  Our findings indicate that FDI has a significant positive contribution to total factor 
productivity.  ODA has a positive contribution towards total factor productivity but it is inversely 
related to capital per worker and human capital.  As nations grow and acquire more and more 
physical and human capital stock, they graduate from aid.  REMI has ambiguous effects between 
current and lagged. Where institutions are improving, REMI increases human capital.  Overall, 
lagged REMI increases both physical and human capital while both current and lagged REMI 
have their most consistent positive effects on total factor productivity.   
Our findings lead to three policy implications result from the study. First, REMI should 
be considered as a complement and not a substitute to ODA and FDI. Above all, of the three 
foreign financing variables, REMI would be the most elusive to policy.  Second, it is possible 
that the negative effects of brain drain can be balanced by growing remittances (Ngoma and 
Ismail, 2013; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013). Third, remittances that are invested in education 
directly increase worker income. This improves the policy recommendations of Nyarko and 
Gyimah-Brempong (2011), who have concluded that in the long run, education could become a 
more important mechanism for social protection than remittances.  While policymakers should 
aim at minimizing emigration, they can at the same time encourage REMI and promote the 
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institutional environment in which not only REMI but all forms of both foreign and domestic 
financing would become more productive.   
Finally, since total factor productivity is a multifactor variable, the individual channels 
through which REMI increase output per worker might still be undisclosed.  According to 
Perkins et al. (2013), total factor productivity is a combination of so many factors not measured 
by physical capital and human capital, and which this analysis cannot disentangle: better trade 
policies, reduction in corruption, management, and technology.  In practice, it also captures the 
net effect of all errors and omissions in data.   Following Moses Abramovitz (1956) we can infer 
that it is a measure of our ignorance about the growth process and /or the individual channels 
through which remittances impact output per worker in SSA.  
  
6. Conclusion  
 This paper has examined the channels through which remittances affect output per 
worker in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) using a production function framework.  It has tackled two 
main questions. First, do remittances increase output per worker in SSA?  Second, what are the 
channels through which remittances might boost output per worker?  We have investigated the 
direct and indirect effects of remittances on incomes using fixed effects and two-step GMM on 
31 SSA countries from 1980-2010. The direct effects have been examined via an extended 
production function while the indirect effects via the factor inputs into a Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  We find that remittances have multiple positive, but mostly indirect, effects 
on output per worker, especially when lagged and/or complemented by education.  We also find 
that remittances have increased the total factor productivity in SSA although the results are still 
sensitive to specification.  
 On the direct effects, remittances have a negative effect on per worker output; the 
interaction between remittances and schooling on the dependent variable is positive or 
complementary, and the interaction of remittances and FDI has a negative or substitution effect.   
The following findings have been established about the indirect effects of remittances on output 
per worker through physical capital per worker, human capital and total factor productivity.  
First, on the capital per worker mechanism, while the ‘individual effect’ of remittance on the 
dependent variable is insignificant with an ambiguous sign, the ‘interactive effect’ of remittance 
with FDI is significantly negative. Second, on the human capital channel, the ‘individual effect’ 
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of remittances is negative while the ‘interaction effect’ with foreign aid and openness are 
positive. This implies that development assistance and openness have a positive complementary 
effect in mitigating the baseline negative incidence of remittances. Third, concerning the total 
factor productivity mechanism, it is established that the ‘individual effects’ of FDI, foreign aid 
and remittances are positive on the dependent variable, whereas the ‘interaction effects’ of 
remittances with FDI and foreign aid are negative. This implies a substitution effect between 
remittances and the other financial flows (FDI and foreign aid) in the effect on total factor 
productivity.  Justifications for the nexuses have been discussed. 
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Notes 
1.The data for remittances does not include the unrecorded flows through formal and informal 
channels.  This suggests that total remittances are a lot higher than reported.  
 
2. Fosu (2012) applies a Cobb-Douglas production function but does not examine the effects of 
external financial flows on output.  
 
3. Data for institutional variables such as Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Regulation 
Quality, Political stability and Control of corruption starts in 1996.  Our approach using a 
production function with human capital has averaged all variables by 5 years. Doing the same 
averaging on institutional variables from The World Governance Indicators leaves us with very 
few data points to work with. Hence we decided to use polity2.  
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Apendix A 
Table 5: World Bank Income Classification of SSA countries  
Country 
World Bank 
Classification Country 
World Bank  
Classification 
Benin Low income Mozambique Low income 
Botswana Upper middle Namibia Upper middle 
Burundi Low income Niger Low income 
Cameroon Lower middle Rwanda Low income 
Central African 
Republic Lower middle Senegal Lower middle 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Low income Sierra Leone Low income 
Congo, Rep. Lower middle South Africa Upper middle 
Cote d'Ivoire Lower middle Sudan Lower middle 
Gabon Upper middle Swaziland Lower middle 
Gambia, The Low income Tanzania Low income 
Ghana Lower middle Togo Low income 
Kenya Low income Uganda Low income 
Lesotho Lower middle Zambia Lower middle 
Liberia Low income Zimbabwe Low income 
Malawi Low income   
Mali Low income   
Mauritius Upper middle   
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Appendix B  
Table 6: Variables  
Variable Source Definition  
GDP  
per worker 
World Bank The natural logarithm of average Gross Domestic Product per 
worker.  
Physical 
Capital 
Authors’ 
computation 
and World 
Bank  
The natural logarithm of average remittances received as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product. Computed using the 
perpetual inventory method on the gross fixed capital formation 
from the World Bank.  
Human Capital  World Bank Barro-Lee Average years of schooling for the people of 15 year 
and over. 
Remittances 
(REMI) 
World Bank The natural logarithm of average remittances received as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product. 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(FDI) 
World Bank The natural logarithm of average Foreign Direct Investment as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product.  
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
(ODA) 
World Bank The natural logarithm of average net Official Development 
Assistance as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product.  
Openness  World Bank the natural logarithm of average openness (sum of exports and 
imports)  as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
Institutions: 
Polity2  
Polity IV 
Project 
Polity2 captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point 
scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy).  It is also a measure of political risk. 
Low-Income; 
Lower-Middle-
Income; and 
Upper-Middle-
Income  
World Bank Low-income economies are those in which 2012 GNI per capita 
was $1,035 or less; Lower middle income group aggregate. 
Lower-middle-income economies are those in which 2012 GNI 
per capita was between $1,036 and $4,085; Upper middle 
income group aggregate. Upper-middle-income economies are 
those in which 2012 GNI per capita was between $4,086 and 
$12,615. 
 
Authors’ 
computation 
The contribution of physical capital to GDP per worker. 
 
 Authors’ 
computation 
The contribution of human capital to GDP per worker.  
 
 Authors’ 
computation 
The contribution of Total Factor Productivity capital to GDP 
per worker. 
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